How the maritime cybersecurity threat picture is changing (the world)

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# Ship as a floating factory

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#### Ship as a floating factory



## What could happen?

#### What can happen?

- An e-mail came, requesting participation in a survey, security related
- Computers tend to be a bit slow
- Increased amount of external traffic observed on the firewall
- One gate opened by itself, can't be closed
- All of the port gates are open, including bonded store
- ID cards don't work, persons can't enter the building
- Power supply problems, cranes don't work
- A small fire in the port facilities
- Port Community Systems do not respond, cargo documents can't be printed or sent
- Ransom (\$250k) request message is displayed on all PCs
- Could it happen?

#### It has already happened. At least in part.



#### What Happened?

The Shahid Rajaee port facility is the newest of two major shipping terminals in the Iranian coastal city of Bandar Abbas, on the Strait of Hormuz. Computers that regulate the flow of vessels, trucks and goods at the port were knocked offline simultaneously on May 9, 2020, disrupting operations and causing road and waterway congestion that lasted several days.

## What about ships?

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#### Ship enters port - what could go wrong?

- Another e-mail came, requesting update to the digital maps on the bridge systems
- Update executed successfully, no problems observed
- Master requests pilot before entering a channel to the port
- Dead slow ahead, as planned. Master informs on small problems with digital maps
- Ship is progressing slowly, other ship reports similar problems with maps
- Ships declares mayday, engine flank ahead, helm hard to port, thrusters don't work
- Ship hits the pier at 6kts
- What could be the worst outcome?



#### What is the cyber attach possible impact?

- Case of the m/v Ever Given/H3RC, IMO 9811000
- This can happen to any tanker or freighter as a result of cyberattack



#### It happened last week!

## It's not Cyber related. At least not yet. But it could be.



#### "Barbro G" IMO 9546796, c/s CQOW, QTH: Detroit River

#### It is all connected!

- Port systems "can see" multiple vessels
- Ship-ship communication
  (e.g. LNG bunkering from LBV)
- Possible malware spread:
  - Both directions
  - Custom malware pointing against industry software (such as ShipManager)
  - Can infect or disable or malfunction OT as well
- Possible impact:
  - Service outage impacting multiple ships
  - Further lateral movement other systems infected



https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/technology/ransomware-attack-severs-1000-ships-from-their-on-shore-servers/ar-AA16vMbu

## Problem is global



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### Attacks timeline

#### Some major cyber attacks over the years

Cyber attach leading to data breach at Svitzer Impact: Email accounts of three employees were secretly auto-forwarded outside the company for 11 months				Malware attack on Mediterranean Shipping Company				Two malware attacks on K- Line				Ransomware attack on DNV	
				mpact: MSC's ward its custome vendor portal b unavailable due network outage	vebsite er and ecame to a o at one		Impact: i) Malware infiltrated the company's IT network, ii) Computer systems were breached with unauthorized access to				Impact: Attack led to shut down of servers hosting software used to manage the crewing and maintenance schedules of		
NotPetya malware	tPetya malware						ovei	overseas subsidiary			about 1,000 vessels across		
attack on Maersk Impact: Nearly 50,00 infected endpoints a thousands of applica and servers across 6 sites in 130 countrie	00 and 500 es	Ransomware att COSCO Shipping Impact: Disabled company's webs email systems a	t <mark>ack on</mark> 1 1 site and cross its	↑      _		Ransomware attack		stems      	HMM cyber a Impact: Com server got in certain area		<mark>ttack</mark> oany's email pacted in		
were affected		US offices		Kuwait Shipping and Transportation Org. Impact: Malicious backdoor tools installed to carry out post- exploitation activities		Impact: servers and inte were sh contain	Peripheral were affected, ernal networks ut down to the spread	   	<b>Transnet:</b> cyber att <b>Impact:</b> IT system v affected leading to of operations at the port's terminals		tack was halt e 20 <sup>22</sup>	2023	
<u>Impact</u> : Affected 52 ships and 58 aircraft with GPS malfunctio	act: Affected 52 s and 58 aircrafts GPS malfunction								2021			India's port container terminal cyber attack	
	2017	17	2018		2019	$\backslash$	2020				'→ -ı	Impact: Ransomware attack affected the container terminal's	
2016		Mass cyber attack at Black Sea Impact: GPS spoofing attack impacting nearly 20 vessels		<b>Cyber attack on US</b> <b>port of San Diago</b> <b>Impact:</b> Malware attack leading to critical credential mining		Internat Org cyb Impact: IMO's IT interrup	ional Maritime er attack Cyber attack or systems ted the services	Cyber attack on CMA CGA n Impact: Almost 500,000 customer record data es threatened to be leaked		MA 10,000 <u>I</u> ata s eaked c i	management information system (MIS) Swire Pacific: cyber attack Impact: Unauthorized access to IT systems resulted in loss of some confidential proprietary commercial information and personal data	management information system (MIS) attack d access to IT oss of some ary commercial onal data	



## Sector is unique

#### What makes maritime security unique?

- Different than pure IT/OT ashore (even in oil & gas industry),
- No direct chain (MASTER responsibility),
- Even OT in maritime sector is unique,
  - Split responsibility,
  - Different maintenance,
  - Very long upgrade process (has to match drydocking),
- Only satellite links available:
  - Satcom links upgrade without updating security posture,
  - Remote access,
  - Security in transit issues,
- Maintenance problem in case of failure.

- Real questions:
  - Is responsibility over IT and OT split?
  - Are superintendents aware of the risk and its mitigation?
  - Are the maintenance procedures up to date?
  - How general remote access policies look like?
  - How data security in transit looks like?
  - Is there any monitoring that pushes data to company ashore?
  - Is it fed to incident response team?



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# What is our business message to maritime company leadership?



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